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ABSTRACT: This study investigates the effect of the type of information to be disclosed
and the possibility of sharing the information anonymously on the intention to share
information through a knowledge management system. Data for the experiment were
collected in two individualist (U.K. and U.S.) and two collectivist (Chile and Mexico)
countries to evaluate the influence of culture on information sharing patterns. The study
finds that although anonymity has no influence on the intention to share successes, the
intention to share failures increases when the information is shared anonymously. Further,
participants from collectivist (versus individualist) cultures are more likely to share failures.
However, the influence of anonymity and culture is limited. Failures are still shared at lower
levels than successes, even in anonymous conditions and in collectivist cultures.




nowledge Management Systems (KMS) have been widely implemented by multinational
companies, including all global audit firms (Vera-Mun˜oz et al. 2006).1 KMS are
particularly important to accounting firms because sharing knowledge can help increase
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1Knowledge management systems are defined by Alavi and Leidner (2001, 114) as ‘‘IT-based systems developed to
support and enhance the organizational processes of knowledge creation, storage/retrieval, transfer, and application.’’
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the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of assurance and tax consulting processes (Vera-Mun˜oz et
al. 2006). The willingness of the knowledge creator to share knowledge is a critical success factor
for KMS implementations (Alavi and Leidner 1999, 2001; Lai 2009); KMS only exist when
someone is willing to share his or her knowledge. If employees do not share their knowledge, the
KMS will contain nothing and, therefore, be ineffective. In fact, KMS implementations frequently
fail because employees are reluctant to share their knowledge (Kankanhalli et al. 2005). For this
reason, motivating employees to share their knowledge is considered to be of primary importance in
successful KMS implementations (King et al. 2002). Despite multiple studies that have investigated
factors that influence employees to post their experiences and knowledge to KMS, our
understanding is still limited (Wolfe and Loraas 2008).
This study examines the possibility of sharing information anonymously as a factor that may
motivate employees to share their failures through a KMS. Success stories—stories that reflect a
personal success—are likely to be shared because they promote the good standing of the
information sharer (O’Leary 2002). Information about failures can reduce avoidable costs, as some
actions that have led to failures in the past may be prevented. Sharing failures is also important to
promote innovation and creativity (Chow et al. 1999; Davenport and Prusak 2000) and
destigmatizes them, acknowledging that failures are inevitable when new ideas are explored
(Chow et al. 1999; Davenport and Prusak 2000). We focus on sharing failures because although
both successes and failures enhance organizational memory and promote organizational learning
(Chow et al. 1999), employees may be more resistant to share failures in comparison to successes.
Despite the potential benefits to the organization, revealing a failure might have negative personal
consequences for the information sharer.
The capability to disseminate information anonymously might promote sharing failures
because the disclosure would not damage an employee’s personal image. Although anonymity has
been identified as an effective mechanism to share sensitive information in public forums
(Christopherson 2007), the assurance of anonymity as an incentive to share knowledge in business
contexts in general, and in KMS in particular, has not been explored. Understanding the influence
of anonymity is also relevant because although anonymity may promote sharing failures, it may
also deter sharing successes. Anonymity eliminates a potential benefit for the sharer; one’s positive
image cannot improve if identities are not disclosed. To avoid unintended consequences, it is
important to understand the impact of anonymity on the type of information (failure or success) to
be shared.
We extend this inquiry across cultures. International accounting firms that implement KMS in
multiple countries must be aware of the factors that may encourage or discourage information
sharing behaviors in different cultures. In the context of face-to-face communication, people from
diverse cultural backgrounds differ in their propensity to share information (Chow et al. 1999;
Salter and Schulz 2005; Schulz et al. 2009). However, research on the influence of culture on
information sharing in the context of KMS is limited. Given that face-to-face and computer-
mediated communication is different (Bordia 1997; Etzioni and Etzioni 1999), findings from
cross-cultural research on face-to-face communication may not extend to KMS. Vera-Mun˜oz et al.
(2006) stress the need to incorporate differences in national culture in knowledge-sharing
investigations.
To summarize, this paper contributes to the accounting information systems literature by
examining the impact of anonymity and culture on intention to share failures through a KMS
using an experimental study with 896 participants from four countries. The experiment is a full
factorial 3 3 2 3 2 between-participants design investigating type of information (successful
experience, nonthreatening failure experience, threatening failure experience), anonymity
(identity disclosed, identity not disclosed), and culture (collectivist, individualist). We compare
the intention to share a successful experience with the intention to share a failed experience
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under anonymous and non-anonymous conditions. We expand the study to cross-cultural
settings by comparing the responses from participants from two different cultural backgrounds
(individualist: U.S. and U.K.; collectivist: Chile and Mexico).
Our results indicate that the ability to post information anonymously increases the intention to
share information about failures but not successes. However, the impact is limited; even under
anonymous conditions the intention to share information about failures is lower than the intention to
share information about successes. Our results also indicate that participants from a collectivist
culture have higher intentions to share information about failures than participants from an
individualist culture, although the intention to share information about failures is still lower than the
intention to share information about successes. Finally, our results indicate no differential impact of
anonymity depending on culture.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II the literature on information sharing is
reviewed. This section also presents the theoretical frameworks used in the study and our research
model. Section III describes the experimental approach. In Section IV, the results from the analysis
are presented and discussed. Section V presents the implications of the study for theory and
practice.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
KMS can be broadly classified into two types: repositories and directories. Repositories are
information warehouses that store knowledge derived from past experiences.2 Knowledge is input
by employees who transform their implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge, thus making it
accessible to other employees. In contrast, directories resemble Yellow Page listings in that they




2 We acknowledge that strictly speaking, knowledge can only reside within the individual (Alavi and Leidner 2001);
however, for the purposes of this study, and similar to extant literature, we use information and knowledge
interchangeably.
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KMS exist because someone is willing to share his or her knowledge. If employees do not
share their knowledge, the KMS will have limited or no effectiveness. Therefore, it is important to
understand the factors that motivate employees to share their knowledge. The research model,
presented in Figure 1, shows the factors investigated in this study. The model shows that the type of
knowledge to be shared (failures compared to successes) influences an individual’s intention to
share knowledge (H1). This relationship is moderated by whether knowledge is shared
anonymously or not (H2), and the cultural background of the individual (H3). Finally, the model
presents an exploratory question to investigate whether culture moderates the influence of
anonymity and the type of knowledge (failure or success) on the intention to share knowledge
(RQ). The rationale of the model and development of the hypotheses are presented below.
Work motivation theories classify types of motivation based on the source of the motivation as
either intrinsic or extrinsic (Deci et al. 1999; Deci and Ryan 1985). Intrinsic motivation originates
from an individual’s values and interests. Intrinsically motivated individuals engage in a behavior
on their own accord. Extrinsic motivation comes from an individual’s desire to obtain a positive
outcome, or avoid a negative outcome. Extrinsically motivated individuals engage in a behavior as
a means to achieve a desired outcome.
Evidence from work motivation studies indicates that intrinsic motivation leads individuals to
share knowledge (Bock et al. 2005; Foss et al. 2009; Kankanhalli et al. 2005). However, intrinsic
motivation derives from an individual’s values and interests; as such, managers’ influence on
intrinsic motivation is limited. According to impression management theory (for a review, see
Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) and self-interest theory (Charness and Rabin 2002; De Dreu and
Nauta 2009), people actively seek to present a positive image of themselves to others and pursue
their own interests. Thus, intrinsic motivation alone might not be enough to influence employees to
share their failures. Employees are aware of the potential negative consequences of sharing failures
and accordingly avoid doing so (Kankanhalli et al. 2005).
Among the reasons people cite for refraining from sharing failures are the impact on their
image and the potential impact on their professional careers (reducing opportunities for promotion
or resulting in being fired) (Chow et al. 2000). Any failure can potentially damage the professional
image of the sharer. However, failures that can lead to a person being fired (a threatening failure)
may have a greater impact than failures where the risk is lower (nonthreatening failures). In a
threatening situation, the potential negative outcome of sharing a failure increases. It is expected,
therefore, that employees will be even more reluctant to share failures as the level of perceived
negative consequences increases. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1a: Intention to share successes is greater than intention to share failures.
H1b: Intention to share nonthreatening failures is greater than intention to share threatening
failures.
Sharing failures is beneficial for the organization, but not for the individual. Given that intrinsic
motivators may be enough to encourage employees to share their successes but not their failures,
the challenge for management is to explore extrinsic motivators to foster failure sharing.
Management has control over the design and use of extrinsic motivators to incentivize knowledge.
However, findings for the impact of extrinsic motivators on knowledge sharing are mixed (Bock et
al. 2005; Burgess 2005; Foss et al. 2009; Kankanhalli et al. 2005). Foss et al. (2009) and Bock et al.
(2005) found that extrinsic motivators have a negative effect on knowledge sharing. In contrast,
other studies have found support for the use of extrinsic motivators to increase knowledge sharing.
Burgess (2005) found that extrinsic motivators positively influence knowledge sharing; the lack of
organizational rewards is considered the main obstacle to share knowledge. Similarly, Kankanhalli
et al. (2005) found a positive relationship between knowledge sharing and receiving organizational
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rewards. This literature investigated knowledge sharing with no reference to sharing failures. To our
knowledge, the literature has not explored factors that can influence individuals to share their
failures through KMS.
Given the managerial relevance of extrinsic motivators and the conflicting findings regarding
their effectiveness in motivating knowledge sharing, we study anonymity—the capability of sharing
information without being identified—as an extrinsic motivator to foster sharing failures. KMS can
accept anonymous postings if the system is designed with this capability. Anonymity removes
potential barriers for individuals who prefer not to share failures in order to protect their
professional image and future career prospects. The impact of anonymity on the intention to share
information has been investigated in the context of computer-mediated communication in public
forums (Christopherson 2007). We expand this area by investigating the impact of anonymity when
sharing failures through KMS.
In the context of electronic media, Spears and Lea (1992) developed the social identity model
of deindividuation effects. This model argues that anonymity reduces the fear of being negatively
evaluated by others; therefore, individuals might share information they would not have shared
otherwise (Spears and Lea 1992). Anonymity decreases evaluation apprehension in public forums
that deal with sensitive information (Christopherson 2007). Although KMS in organizations differ
from public forums—public forums do not involve a job relationship and exchanges generally take
place only online—the findings from public forums can be extrapolated to KMS settings. That is,
anonymity can incentivize sharing failures because the identity of the sharer is protected, deterring
potential negative consequences.
Anonymity may encourage employees to share failures, but may also discourage them from
sharing successes because the expected benefits from improving the sharer’s personal reputation
disappear when the sharer’s identity is not disclosed. Therefore, designing KMS to allow
anonymity can have unintended consequences on the intention to share knowledge. Assessing the
influence of anonymity on intention to share failures and successes can determine the existence of a
differential impact based on the type of information to be shared. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H2a: Intention to share failures is greater when information is shared anonymously than when
information is shared non-anonymously.
H2b: Intention to share successes is greater when information is shared non-anonymously
than when information is shared anonymously.
We expand our inquiry to cross-cultural settings. The Big 4, along with other large accounting
firms, use their KMS across their different locations worldwide; however, little is known about
whether culture may influence employees’ use of KMS (Arnold et al. 2005; Vera-Mun˜oz et al.
2006). Evidence from cross-cultural research in face-to-face communication has demonstrated that
culture influences information-sharing behavior—people from collectivist cultures share more
information than people from individualist cultures (Chow et al. 1999; Salter et al. 2008; Salter and
Schulz 2005). There is also evidence that people from different cultural backgrounds use KMS
differently—people from high power distance cultures rely more on information provided by KMS
than people from low power distance cultures (Arnold et al. 2005). However, our understanding of
the impact of culture on information sharing in the context of KMS is limited (Leidner and
Kayworth 2006).
We use Hofstede’s (1980) cultural framework to understand the effect of culture on the
intention to share knowledge in KMS. Even though several theoretical frameworks have been
developed to explain cultural differences (House et al. 2004; Schwartz 1994; Triandis 1995),
Hofstede’s framework has had a significant influence on cross-cultural research (Sivakumar and
Nakata 2001). Hofstede’s framework describes cultures along five dimensions. We focus on the
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individualism/collectivism dimension for two reasons. First, the individualism/collectivism
dimension is considered a key factor in distinguishing cultural groups (Chow et al. 2000). Second,
while other cultural dimensions have been hypothesized to affect information sharing, there has
been no evidence to support these hypotheses (Ardichvili et al. 2006).
Individualism/collectivism is the degree to which group or individual interest prevails. The
individualism/collectivism dimension predicts that in collectivist cultures the interest of the group
prevails over the interest of the individual. In collectivist cultures, people might be more willing to
share failures because it is good for the group; it also demonstrates affiliation with the group and
support to accomplish the group’s goals (Chow et al. 1999). Given that in collectivist cultures group
objectives are more relevant than individual objectives, sharing failures is more likely to occur to
support the group despite the potential negative consequences for the individual. People from
individualist cultures have less incentive to share failures because individual objectives are more
salient than group objectives; the potential negative consequences for the individual outweigh the
potential benefits for the group.
Wolfe and Loraas (2008) find initial evidence for the influence of culture on intentions to share
knowledge through KMS. Although participants in their study were drawn from a single country (U.S.)
and they did not investigate sharing failures, their findings support the influence of the individualism/
collectivism dimension on knowledge sharing. In their study, they measured individualism and
collectivism as a personal orientation based on Triandis’ (1995) cultural framework. Triandis’
framework further disaggregates the individualism/collectivism dimension into vertical and horizontal
orientation, resulting in four possible combinations. The vertical and horizontal orientation reflects
differences in acceptance of social hierarchies and competitiveness. These orientations are similar to
Hofstede’s cultural dimension of power distance, although the underlying assumptions are theoretically
different (Shavitt et al. 2006). Wolfe and Loraas (2008) found that a vertical collectivist orientation—-
where the interest of the group prevails and social hierarchies are accepted—had a positive influence on
knowledge sharing. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H3: Intention to share failures is greater for participants from collectivist cultures than for
participants from individualist cultures.
Culture might not only influence the intention to share failures but also the impact of external
motivators and the use of KMS. Managers from different cultures perceive their employees to be
motivated differently. DeVoe and Iyengar (2004) compared managers’ perceptions of their
employees’ source of motivation. They found that American managers perceived their subordinates
to be more extrinsically than intrinsically motivated. Latin American managers perceived their
subordinates to be more intrinsically than extrinsically motivated. Finally, Asian managers perceived
their subordinates to be equally intrinsically and extrinsically motivated. Interestingly, subordinates
across all cultures indicated that they were more intrinsically than extrinsically motivated.
Participants from an individualist culture may be more or less influenced by the capability of posting
information anonymously than participants from a collectivist culture. The literature on motivation
across cultures has not examined the influence of motivators when the behavior desired is potentially
detrimental for the individual, as is the case of sharing failures. The intent of using anonymity is to
promote sharing failures, but anonymity might be perceived differently by people from different cultural
backgrounds and ultimately impact the intention to share failures or successes differently. If this is the
case, the impact of anonymity will be moderated by the cultural background of the individual. Given the
lack of theory to hypothesize the presence and direction of these effects, we propose an exploratory
question to investigate whether anonymity influences participants in a different way depending on their
cultural background (individualist or collectivist):
RQ: Does cultural background moderate the influence of anonymity?
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III. RESEARCH METHOD
We conducted an experiment to investigate the influence of anonymity as an extrinsic
motivator on the intention to share information in cross-cultural settings. The experiment
included three factors: type of information, capability of sharing information anonymously
(anonymity), and cultural background of the individual (culture). Type of information was
manipulated at three levels: (1) positive (success story), (2) negative nonthreatening (failure
story with no direct consequences), and (3) negative threatening (failure story with direct
consequences). The capability of posting information anonymously was manipulated at two
levels: (1) anonymous postings (identity not disclosed), and (2) non-anonymous postings
(identity disclosed). The cultural background of the individual is a blocking variable at two
levels: (1) individualist culture (U.S. and U.K.), and (2) collectivist culture (Chile and Mexico).
The experiment is a between-subjects 3 3 2 3 2 full factorial design.
Instrument
This was a vignette-based experiment in which participants were given a hypothetical business
scenario that included a KMS and were asked about their intention to share the information.
Participants first read the scenario and then responded to a questionnaire. The business scenario
varied depending on the factors manipulated. In addition to the two factors manipulated (type of
information and anonymity), the experiment also manipulated the expectation of receiving a
monetary reward. However, this manipulation was not successful. The main effect and interaction
effects were not significant in any analyses; therefore, we collapsed the cells from this
manipulation.
There were 12 different business scenarios and to test for possible order effects, two versions of
each scenario were developed where questions were asked in reverse order resulting in a total of 24
versions of the questionnaire. Appendix A includes the information presented in the vignettes. Data
were collected in two English-speaking countries (U.K. and U.S.) and two Spanish-speaking
countries (Chile and Mexico). The instrument was designed in English and translated into Spanish,
and then back translated to English by fully bilingual individuals. Both the English and Spanish
versions were pilot tested. The instrument was administered in class by one of the authors or a
colleague in the country of collection.
Variables
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable—intention to share knowledge—was measured in two ways. First, it
was measured as the intention to share knowledge on a seven-point Likert scale (‘‘you would post
the information’’). Second, it was measured as a dichotomous variable, yes/no, to force participants
to make a decision. We also asked participants if they believed they should post the information
(‘‘you should post the information’’). We posed this question to raise participants’ awareness of the
difference between intended behavior and normative behavior and help them focus on what they
would do, rather than what they should do.
Sharing knowledge is a desirable value and participants might not want to be seen as selfish for
not sharing their knowledge; therefore, participants might respond that they intend to share their
knowledge even though they are not likely to do so. This tendency of participants to tailor their
responses to enhance their social image is known as social desirability response bias (Douglas et al.
1996). To control for this effect, we presented the business scenario as describing a coworker. We
then asked participants whether they thought their coworkers would share their knowledge (‘‘Your
coworker will post the information in the KMS’’). We also asked participants whether they thought
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their coworkers should share their knowledge (‘‘Your coworker should post the information in the
KMS’’), as explained above, to raise participants’ awareness of the difference between intended
behavior and normative behavior. Responses were both in a seven-point Likert scale and
dichotomous yes/no. Comparing these two sets of responses—responses about the individual and
responses about an unrelated person—allows identifying socially desirable responses. This self-
other comparison procedure is recommended by Cuixia et al. (2003). They argue that if people
consistently regard themselves more positively than others, this tendency might reflect self-
enhancing responses.
We measured intentions to share, not actual sharing of information. However, the theory of
reasoned action links intentions and actual behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Findings from past
studies show that intentions are highly predictive of actual behavior (Kuo and Young 2008; Webb
and Sheeran 2006). Appendix B includes the questions that measured the dependent and control
variables.
Independent Variables
Table 1 summarizes each of the independent variables. Type of information was
manipulated at three levels: positive, negative nonthreatening, and negative threatening
information. Under the positive information condition, the scenario described a success story
that when revealed, could help other employees replicate the success. Under the negative
nonthreatening information condition, the scenario described a failure story reflecting a mistake
that when revealed, could help other employees avoid making the same mistake. The negative
threatening information described the same failure story and also indicated the possibility that
the informant would lose his or her job.
Anonymity was manipulated at two levels: anonymous and non-anonymous. In the
anonymous condition the scenario stated that the identity of the person sharing the information
was not disclosed. The scenario indicated that the KMS was managed by an independent
company that ensured absolute anonymity of the person posting the information. In the non-
anonymous condition the scenario stated that the identity of the person sharing the information
was disclosed (name, department, and email).
Culture was distinguished at two levels: individualist and collectivist cultures. The
individualist culture was represented by participants from the U.S. and the U.K. The collectivist
culture was represented by participants from Chile and Mexico. According to Hofstede’s (1980)
dimensions these dyads are on opposite ends of several cultural dimensions, in particular the




Type of information Positive (success story)
Negative nonthreatening (failure story with no possibility of being fired)
Negative threatening (failure story with possibility of being fired)
Anonymity No anonymity (identity of the information sharer disclosed)
Yes anonymity (identity of the information sharer not disclosed)
Culture Individualist (U.K. and U.S.)
Collectivist (Chile and Mexico)
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Chile and Mexico are 23 and 30 respectively, describing a more collectivist culture than the
U.K. and the U.S. with scores of 89 and 91 respectively.
Control Variables and Manipulation Checks
As described in the literature review, there is ample evidence that intrinsic motivation
influences knowledge sharing. Given that the focus of the study is on the impact of extrinsic
motivators, we control for two intrinsic motivators that may influence knowledge sharing:
attitude toward sharing knowledge and perceived effect on image. Controlling for these factors
allows for investigating the effect of extrinsic motivators beyond the effect of intrinsic
motivators.
Attitude toward sharing knowledge is the degree to which people have positive feelings
about knowledge sharing (Bock et al. 2005). Attitude toward sharing knowledge influences
knowledge sharing because such favorable attitudes result in greater intentions to share
knowledge (Bock et al. 2005). We measured attitude toward sharing knowledge with four
questions from Bock et al. (2005) using a seven-point Likert scale (1-strongly disagree to 7-
strongly agree).
Perceived effect on image, the degree to which people believe that knowledge sharing
improves the sharer’s reputation, influences knowledge sharing because people enjoy being
recognized by others for their sharing behavior (Kankanhalli et al. 2005). People who share
high-quality information increase their prestige among their coworkers (Kollock 1998). We
measured perceived effect on image with four questions from Kankanhalli et al. (2005) using a
seven-point Likert scale (1-strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree).
Manipulation checks were included to test the effective delivery of the experimental
treatments. Two questions tested whether participants understood the scenario. We also tested
the blocking variable (cultural group) by asking participants the four questions for the
individualism/collectivism dimension in Hofstede’s (1980) instrument. Answers from these
questions allowed us to test the cultural affinity of participants confirming the assumption as to
each dyad’s cultural profile.3 We also asked participants in which country they were raised as a
child/teenager and which language they spoke at home. Finally, we collected data for
demographic variables (gender, experience, and age).
Sample
We collected data from four countries: U.K. and U.S. (individualist), and Chile and
Mexico (collectivist). Participants in this study were enrolled in professional continuing
education courses or were part-time graduate business students. Business students were
considered appropriate participants for this experiment because of their work experience and
familiarity with the business environment.
Two questions were asked to ensure that participants belonged to the culture of the country
under investigation. The first question asked participants which country they were raised in as a
child/teenager; the second question asked which language they spoke at home. Participants who
were not raised in the country of interest or who did not speak the native language at home
were excluded from the analysis, as they did not represent the cultural group from where the
data were collected. Participants who did not answer these demographic questions were also
excluded from the analysis. From an original sample of 1,119 participants, 203 participants
3 Some studies criticize the collection of Hofstede’s cultural data for use at the individual level, so this is merely a
check of variables used in prior studies.
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were excluded, resulting in a final sample of 916 participants. Further, participants with blank
responses to the dependent or control variables were excluded, leaving a net sample of 896
participants. Table 2 shows the number of responses eliminated from the original sample size,
the reason for elimination, and the descriptive statistics for the sample. The sample for the U.K.
had the most full time work experience (16.43 years) while the U.S. sample had the least (10.4
years). The sample was predominantly male with an average female participation rate of 34.9
percent.
We also evaluated whether participants from the four countries differed culturally by
comparing their scores on the individualist/collectivist dimension. We calculated the scores
based on Hofstede’s formula and based on the individual level mean.4 Using Hofstede’s
formula, the order of the countries from collectivist to individualist is: Chile (82.85), Mexico
(91.35), U.S. (95.94), and U.K. (113.28). Using the individual level mean to calculate the
scores, the order of the countries from collectivist to individualist is the same as when we use
Hofstede’s formula: Chile (2.85), Mexico (2.93), U.S. (3.02), and U.K. (3.18). The results from
the contrasts analyses indicate that all four countries are significantly different from one another
(p , 0.05). When pooled together, the score from the more individualist countries (U.K. and
U.S.) is significantly higher than the score from the more collectivist countries (Chile and
Mexico) (p , 0.001). We conducted further analyses to evaluate whether pooling Chile and
Mexico in a collectivist group and the U.K. and the U.S. in an individualist group was
appropriate and concluded that the grouping was acceptable.5
TABLE 2
Sample Size and Descriptive Statistics
Chile Mexico U.K. U.S. Overall
Original sample size 506 152 124 337 1,119
Number of participants who were not raised in the
country of collection or did not speak native
language at home.
15 6 17 133 171
Number of participants who did not answer where they
were raised or the language they spoke at home
21 2 4 5 32
Number of participants who did not answer dependent
or control variables
11 2 4 3 20
Final sample size 459 142 99 196 896
Number of participants who did not disclose
demographic information
7 0 4 3 14
Number of participants who provided demographic
information
452 142 95 193 882
Age—mean 37.12 32.48 36.73 30.21 34.83
Years of experience—mean 13.67 10.35 16.43 10.4 12.71
Female (%) 32.5 26.8 42.9 42.7 34.9
Male (%) 67.5 73.2 57.1 57.3 65.1
4 Hofstede’s formula is a weighted average. Individual-level means are considered appropriate for individual-level
analyses (Bearden et al. 2006; Taras et al. 2010). Higher values indicate a higher degree of individualism in both
scores.
5 We estimated ANOVAs on the dependent variable splitting the sample to compare Mexicans to Chileans, and
Americans to British. We also estimated an ANOVA on the dependent variable including each country separately.
The results from these analyses can be requested from the authors.
102 Huerta, Salter, Lewis, and Yeow




Control variables (attitude toward sharing knowledge and perceived effect on image) were
calculated as the mean of the responses to the questions for each construct. Reliability was tested
using Cronbach’s (1951) alpha, resulting in a value of 0.81 for the attitude toward sharing
knowledge index, and 0.91 for the image index, both above the recommended 0.70 (Nunnally and
Bernstein 1994). Construct validity was tested using principal components and varimax rotation.
Loadings over 0.70 are considered excellent (Comrey 1973). All items loaded on the intended
constructs with loadings above 0.70, thus demonstrating the discriminant validity of the constructs.
Social Desirability Response Bias
We follow Cuixia et al. (2003) to determine Social Desirability Response Bias (SDRB) by
comparing the responses for the participants’ intention to share knowledge and their perception of
their coworkers’ intention to share knowledge. Participants responded to these questions using a
seven-point Likert scale and a dichotomous yes/no response. A t-test was used for the questions
measured with a Likert scale and a Chi-square for the questions with dichotomous responses. In
both cases SDRB was significant (p , 0.001). That is, participants reported higher intentions to
share their knowledge than their coworkers would have. The reported results are from the analysis
conducted using the answers that are less vulnerable to this bias: participants’ perceptions of their
coworkers’ intentions to share knowledge. We discuss the results from the analysis using
participants’ intentions to share knowledge in the sensitivity analyses section.
Analysis of Variance
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations for coworkers’ intention to share
information under each experimental condition. We used analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the
significance of the differences between experimental conditions (factors) and further explored these
differences with pairwise comparisons to test differences across each factor at all levels.
We designed the experiment with the goal of having a similar number of participants in each
experimental condition. However, three factors influenced the final size of each condition. First, the
TABLE 3







No anonymity 5.41 4.76 4.26
(1.58) (1.71) (1.98)
Yes anonymity 5.22 4.40 4.73
(1.60) (2.01) (1.89)
Individualist
No anonymity 5.51 3.59 3.09
(1.35) (1.60) (1.79)
Yes anonymity 4.78 3.94 3.49
(1.44) (1.41) (1.34)
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instrument was administered in intact groups (graduate business courses and professional
continuing education courses), limiting the number of participants to individuals enrolled in the
courses. Second, responses from foreign students (relative to the country of collection) were
eliminated from the sample. Third, responses from participants who failed to respond to
demographic questions were also eliminated from the sample. As a result, the number of responses
for each cultural group was different. Considering the unequal number of participants in each
experimental condition, we used Overall and Spiegel’s (1969) Method I to calculate the sum of
squares for the ANOVA.6 The results for the ANOVA are reported in Table 4.
Table 4 shows a significant main effect for type of information (p , 0.001) and culture (p ,
0.001). There are significant interactions for type of information and anonymity (p¼0.028), and for
type of information and culture (p¼0.003). The research question exploring an interaction between
anonymity and cultural group is not significant (two-way interaction p ¼ 0.648, three-way
interaction p ¼ 0.180). As expected, the two control variables capturing intrinsic motivation
(attitude toward knowledge sharing and perceived effect on image) are significant (both p , 0.01).
In the presence of significant interactions, interpreting main effects may be misleading because
they present a partial view of the total effect (Gamst et al. 2008). Therefore, following Gamst et al.
(2008), we interpret the significant interactions by testing the different effects with pairwise
comparisons—comparing estimated marginal means across all experimental conditions.7
Conducting multiple comparisons using the same sample increases family-wise error. Several
procedures have been developed to control for family-wise error in pairwise comparisons; among
TABLE 4
Hypotheses Tests: Effects of Type of Information, Anonymity, and Culture on Coworkers’








Corrected Model 493.83 13 37.99 13.29 , 0.001
Intercept 109.22 1 109.22 38.21 , 0.001
Type of information (H1) 230.49 2 115.25 40.32 , 0.001
Anonymity 2.66 1 2.66 0.93 0.335
Culture 48.67 1 48.67 17.03 , 0.001
Type of information  Anonymity (H2) 20.47 2 10.23 3.58 0.028
Type of information  Culture (H3) 33.61 2 16.80 5.88 0.003
Anonymity  Culture 0.60 1 0.60 0.21 0.648
Type of information  Culture  Anonymity (RQ) 9.82 2 4.91 1.72 0.180
Attitude toward knowledge sharing 53.30 1 53.30 18.64 , 0.01
Perceived effect on image 24.38 1 2.66 8.53 , 0.01
Error 2521.28 882
Total 21412.00 896
Corrected Total 3015.13 895
R2 ¼ 0.16
6 Method I is identified as Type III sum of squares in SPSS and SAS. Method I is appropriate when the difference in
the size of the groups is the result of data-gathering procedures and not related to the actual distribution of the
population (Howell 2002; Rutherford 2001; Tabachnick and Fidell 2006), which is the case in our study.
7 In pairwise comparisons, the estimated marginal mean for each experimental condition is calculated based on the
ordinary least squares of the general linear model. The difference in the means of each pair is then tested for
statistical significance.
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them, Bonferroni and Sidak are considered conservative procedures (Gamst et al. 2008).8 We report
significance levels following the Sidak adjustment. To calculate the estimated marginal means for
pairwise comparisons, the covariates in the model (control variables) are evaluated at their means
with the following values: attitude toward knowledge sharing¼ 6.12, perceived effect on image¼
4.10.
The pattern where positive information is shared at greater levels than negative information
(H1a), and where negative nonthreatening information is shared at greater levels than negative
threatening information (H1b) is observed in most pairwise comparisons. These comparisons and
the corresponding level of significance are reported below across experimental conditions. The
effectiveness of anonymity as a motivator to share failures can be evaluated by comparing
intentions to share failures relative to the intentions to share successes. In this way, the intention to
share successes establishes a baseline to evaluate the impact of anonymity. Figure 2 depicts the
pairwise comparisons for the interaction between type of information and anonymity. As expected,
participants have a higher intention to share positive information than negative information both in
anonymous and non-anonymous conditions supporting H1a (p, 0.001 for negative nonthreatening
and threatening, Table 5, Panel B). Participants have a higher intention to share negative threatening
information anonymously than when their identity is disclosed (p ¼ 0.007, Table 5, Panel A),
therefore H2a is supported. The impact of anonymity is limited though, because this effect is not
observed in the negative nonthreatening condition (p¼ 0.79, Table 5, Panel A). Moreover, even in
anonymous conditions, positive information is still shared at higher levels than negative
information (p , 0.001, Table 5, Panel B). Anonymity has no impact when the information is
positive (p ¼ 0.29, Table 5, Panel A); therefore H2b is not supported. This result indicates that
anonymity has no detrimental effect on information sharing; positive information is shared at the
same level for anonymous and non-anonymous conditions.
Figure 3 depicts the pairwise comparisons for the interaction between type of information and
culture. As expected, participants from both cultural groups (individualist and collectivist) have a
higher intention to share positive information than negative information (p , 0.001 for
nonthreatening and threatening. Table 6, Panel A). Participants from collectivist cultures have a
higher intention to share negative information than participants from individualist cultures (p ¼
0.006 for negative nonthreatening and p , 0.001 for negative threatening, Table 6, Panel B),
therefore, H3 is supported. Positive information is shared at the same level by both cultures (p ¼
0.95, Table 6, Panel B). The impact of culture is limited though; even for collectivist cultures,
positive information is shared at higher levels than negative information (p , 0.001, Table 6, Panel
A). Table 7 summarizes the results for the hypotheses.
Sensitivity Analyses
Several analyses were conducted to test the robustness of the results.9 First, manipulation
checks and demographic variables (gender, experience, and age) were added as control
variables in an extended ANOVA; none of the demographic variables were significant and
there was no change in the pattern of significance. Second, given that the control variables
(covariates) were statistically significant, we further explored whether the covariates interacted
with the treatment groups. We found small but significant correlations between attitude toward
8 To control for alpha inflation, Sidak and Bonferroni procedures divide the alpha level determined for significance
(established at the conventional level of 0.05 in our study) by the total number of pairwise comparisons (in Sidak
by an adjusted number of pairwise comparisons); the resulting adjusted alpha is used to test for statistical
significance. That is, the adjustment controls for alpha inflation and retains alpha levels at 0.05 in all pairwise
comparisons. In our study, both adjustments—Bonferroni and Sidak—yielded the same pattern of significance.
9 The results from these analyses can be requested from the authors.
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knowledge sharing and cultural group (r ¼ 0.29; p , 0.01), and perceived effect on image and
type of information and anonymity (r ¼ 0.14; p , 0.001 and r ¼ 0.26; p , 0.01 respectively).
Considering that small correlations between covariates and independent variables are acceptable
(Evans and Anastasio 1968; Miller and Chapman 2001), we do not consider these correlations
a threat to interpreting the results. Nevertheless, we conducted the following analysis to identify
whether heterogeneous slopes for the cultural groups influenced the interpretation of the results.
First, we conducted an ANOVA excluding the covariates and found the same pattern of
statistical significance as in the analyses with the covariates included. Second, we split the
sample and conducted separate ANOVAs for each cultural group. We found the same pattern of
statistical significance as in the analysis with the full sample. Finally, the analysis using
regression (mentioned below) does not indicate problems of multicollinearity based on the
results of variance inflation factors below 2.
We also analyzed the hypotheses using participants’ intention to share knowledge as the
dependent variable rather than coworkers’ intention to share knowledge; as expected, the results are
FIGURE 2
Interaction for Type of Information and Anonymity for Coworkers’ Intention to Share
Knowledge
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strongly biased by social desirability responses. Figure 4 illustrates the interaction between type of
information and cultural group. Figure 4 sharply contrasts with Figure 3, in particular for the
collectivist cultural group, illustrating the effect of social desirability response bias. Participants
from the collectivist cultural group portray themselves as always willing to share information
regardless of the type of information to be disclosed.
We also compared responses between the normative (you/your coworker should share the
information) and the intended behavior (you/your coworker will share the information). As
mentioned above, these questions were posed to raise participants’ awareness of the difference
between intended behavior and normative behavior. In all comparisons the appropriate behavior
(should share) was higher than the intended behavior (will share) (p , 0.001).
We also analyzed the hypotheses with regression using both coworkers’ intention and
participants’ intention to share knowledge as the dependent variables. The results from the
regression showed the same results. Finally, we used logistic regression to analyze the dichotomous
responses in both coworkers’ and participants’ intention to share knowledge. The results showed
similar patterns of significance.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We conducted an experiment that manipulated two factors—the type of information to be
disclosed and the capability of sharing information anonymously—to investigate the intention to
share information through a knowledge management system. We focus our inquiry on intentions to
share information that discloses failures (negative information), using intentions to share
information that discloses successes (positive information) as a baseline. Negative information is
TABLE 5
Pairwise Comparisons for Anonymity
Panel A: Type of Information across Anonymity





Positive No anonymity (identity disclosed) Yes anonymity 0.24 0.29
Negative nonthreatening No anonymity (identity disclosed) Yes anonymity 0.06 0.79
Negative threatening No anonymity (identity disclosed) Yes anonymity 0.54 0.007
Sidak adjustment; covariates included.








Yes anonymity Positive Negative nonthreatening 0.89 , 0.001
Positive Negative threatening 0.88 , 0.001
Negative nonthreatening Negative threatening 0.01 1
No anonymity
(identity disclosed)
Positive Negative nonthreatening 1.18 , 0.001
Positive Negative threatening 1.66 , 0.001
Negative nonthreatening Negative nonthreatening 0.48 0.07
Sidak adjustment; covariates included.
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further divided into threatening and nonthreatening; the former includes in the scenario potentially
severe consequences for the sharer, such as the risk of being fired. We expanded this inquiry to
cross-cultural settings by comparing two cultural groups: individualist (U.K. and U.S.) and
collectivist (Chile and Mexico). The experimental design is a full factorial 3 3 2 3 2 (type of
information, anonymity, and culture) between participants using a vignette-based approach.
As expected, the intention to share information reflecting successes is higher than the intention
to share information reflecting failures (supporting H1a), and the intention to share nonthreatening
failures is higher than the intention to share threatening failures (supporting H1b). As O’Leary
(2002) indicates, KMS are more likely to contain information about ‘‘things that went right’’ than
‘‘things that went wrong.’’ This bias represents a challenge to accounting firms seeking to develop
their organizational memory through KMS. Sharing failures is relevant for organizations as other
employees can learn from unsuccessful experiences. Despite the benefits for the organization,
FIGURE 3
Interaction for Type of Information and Culture for Coworkers’ Intention to Share
Knowledge
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sharing failures is detrimental for the sharer. Therefore, it is relevant for organizations to identify
mechanisms that incentivize employees to share failures. One potential mechanism is the possibility
of sharing the information anonymously.
Our second hypothesis stated that the capability to share information anonymously would
increase sharing intentions for negative information (H2a) and decrease intentions for positive
information (H2b), compared to conditions where the identity of the sharer is disclosed. Our
findings indicate that anonymity increases the intention to share information disclosing failures
(supporting H2a), although the influence of anonymity is limited. First, we only observe an
influence of anonymity when the information to be shared is negative with potentially severe
consequences (negative threatening), but not when it is negative with no potentially severe
consequences (negative nonthreatening). Second, when we use the level of sharing information
disclosing successes as a baseline to evaluate the effect of anonymity, we find that negative
information, even in anonymous conditions, is still shared at lower levels than positive information.
Our findings also indicate that anonymity has no impact on the intention to share positive
information (no support for H2b). Anonymity eliminates the positive outcomes for the information
sharer, so anonymity could act as a disincentive for sharing positive information; however, our
findings do not indicate evidence of this potential drawback of anonymity. Our results suggest that
predictions drawn from the social identity model of deindividuation effects theory must be adjusted
to the context under study and that the impact of anonymity should not be overstated.
Our third hypothesis stated that the cultural background of the participant would influence
sharing intentions; participants from collectivist cultures would have higher sharing intentions for
information disclosing failures. We find that culture has an effect on sharing negative information
TABLE 6
Pairwise Comparisons for Culture








Collectivist Positive Negative nonthreatening 0.73 , 0.001
Positive Negative threatening 0.77 , 0.001
Negative nonthreatening Negative threatening 0.04 1
Individualist Positive Negative nonthreatening 1.34 , 0.001
Positive Negative threatening 1.77 , 0.001
Negative nonthreatening Negative threatening 0.44 0.19
Sidak adjustment; covariates included.
Panel B: Type of Information across Culture
Type of Information Culture (Base) Culture (Compared with)
Mean
Difference Significance
Positive Collectivist Individualist 0.02 0.95
Negative nonthreatening Collectivist Individualist 0.59 0.006
Negative threatening Collectivist Individualist 0.99 , 0.001
Sidak adjustment; covariates included.
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(supporting H3), but no effect on sharing positive information. Consistent with prior accounting
literature on face-to-face communications, participants from collectivist cultures are more willing to
share information disclosing failures than participants from individualist cultures (Schulz et al.
2009). However, our findings indicate that there is a limit on this cultural influence. Even in
collectivist cultures people are not willing to openly disclose negative information to the same
degree as they are willing to disclose positive information. The limit of cultural influence on
people’s behavior was suggested by Leung et al. (2005) but had not been empirically demonstrated.
The interaction between culture and the type of information to be disclosed indicates the need to
understand the limits of cultural influence to avoid generalizations that might not be valid. Culture
does not override the need to protect one’s own interests. Finally, our exploratory question
investigated whether the influence of anonymity depended on cultural backgrounds. Our findings
indicate no differences for participants from individualist and collectivist cultures. Participants from
both cultures were influenced in the same way by the capability to share information anonymously.
From a methodological perspective, the effect of social desirability response bias reinforces the
need to control for this effect. Asking participants about their own behavior and the expected
behavior of their coworkers was useful to identify and control for this type of bias. This self-other
comparison is important in this type of research, where the negative consequences for the individual
TABLE 7
Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Hypotheses Results Additional Comments
H1a: Intention to share successes is
greater than intention to share
failures.
Supported Effect observed in all conditions
H1b: Intention to share nonthreatening
failures is greater than intention to
share threatening failures.
H2a: Intention to share failures is
greater when information is shared
anonymously than when information
is shared non-anonymously.
H2a Supported Effect observed in negative threatening
information only.
No detrimental effect observed for
positive information.
H2b: Intention to share successes is
greater when information is shared
non-anonymously than when
information is shared anonymously.
H2b Not supported Effect is limited because negative
information is shared at lower levels
than positive information even on
anonymous conditions.
H3: Intention to share failures is
greater for participants from
collectivist cultures than for
participants from individualist
cultures.
Supported Effect observed for nonthreatening and
threatening information.
No difference observed for positive
information.
Effect is limited because negative
information is shared at lower levels
than positive information even for
the collectivist group.
RQ: Does cultural background




No differences observed in any
condition.
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contrast with the potential benefits for the organization. People would not like to be perceived as
selfish or uncooperative, so they portray themselves as someone who would share negative
information despite possible undesirable consequences. However, the same behavior is not
expected from coworkers.
The experiment also manipulated the expectation of a monetary reward. However, these cells
were collapsed given the unsuccessful manipulation of this factor. The analyses conducted without
the cells collapsed yielded the same patterns of significance. The experiment was a vignette
presenting a hypothetical scenario, so the expectation of a monetary reward was also hypothetical.
A better manipulation of the expectation of monetary reward for experimental purposes needs to be
explored.
In practical terms, our findings can help accounting firms in developing incentives to encourage
knowledge sharing. Managers should be aware that anonymity increases the intention to disclose
negative information, but the influence is limited and does not promote negative information
FIGURE 4
Interaction for Type of Information and Culture for Participants’ Intention to Share
Knowledge
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sharing to the same degree as sharing positive information. For this reason, managers should
acknowledge that the type of information most likely to be disclosed in KMS is limited to positive
or mildly negative information.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Comparing experiments with other research approaches, the major drawback of experiments is
limited external validity. Therefore, it is possible that the intention to share information in a job
environment will be affected by other variables such as organizational culture (Kankanhalli et al.
2005). Despite the limited external validity, experiments are the preferred method to show evidence
for causality and are appropriate for cross-cultural studies (Leung et al. 2005).
In our study, anonymity indicates that the identity of the sharer is not disclosed in the posting.
However, certain circumstances can provide a means of identifying a person, even when his or her
identity is not disclosed explicitly. For instance, if one individual is responsible for a task and there
is a task failure, then the identity of the person can be inferred even if no name is entered into the
KMS. Under these circumstances, the capability of reporting anonymously in the KMS is limited to
not disclosing the identity of the sharer, although his or her identity may still be known. Future
research can explore the factors influencing the perceived anonymity of KMS. It is possible that the
task or other factors influence the effect of anonymity as a mechanism to motivate sharing.
The current study investigated the influence of the cultural background of the sharer on the
intention to share information through KMS. To ensure that participants belonged to the culture
under investigation, only responses from participants who were raised and spoke the native
language at home of the country under investigation were included in the analysis. However, it is
possible that the culture of the country where people live, rather than from the culture where they
were born and raised, or a combination of both, determines the intention to share information. This
question remains open for further research. Also, cultural variables are generally correlated with
other factors such as economic development (Ford et al. 2003; Kirkman et al. 2006). Although our
study tested for the participants’ cultural affinity to the cultural variable under study (individualism/
collectivism), it is possible that the differences observed can be the result of unmeasured variables
correlated with culture.
Future research is also needed to explore effective manipulations of the expectation of
monetary rewards in vignette-based studies. Finally, the relevance of the intrinsic motivators
controlled in our study (attitude toward sharing and perceived effect on image) suggests that further
research is warranted. Future studies may test differences in intrinsic motivators to share knowledge
across cultures.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
The three factors originally manipulated in the experiments were: type of information,
anonymity, and expectation of monetary reward. The cells from monetary reward were later
collapsed. Table 8 presents the three levels manipulated for the type of information. Table 9
presents the two levels for anonymity and expectation of monetary reward.
TABLE 8
Levels for Type of Information
Type of Information Manipulation
Positive A coworker of yours recently improved a procedure to reduce the time
to complete certain projects. If other people in the company knew
about his/her improvement they could replicate the procedure saving
time and money.
Negative and nonthreatening A coworker of yours made a mistake last year when working on a
project that could have had serious consequences for the company.
Fortunately, no negative consequences resulted from his/her mistake,
the company was not held responsible, and he/she is no longer at
risk of being fired for his/her mistake. If other people in the
company knew about his/her mistake they could avoid doing the
same mistake.
Negative threatening A coworker of yours made a mistake when working on a project that
can have serious consequences for the company. Because of the
potential seriousness of the consequences he/she might be fired if he/
she discloses the mistake. However, if other people in the company
knew about his/her mistake they could avoid doing the same mistake
lessening the firm’s exposure to risk.
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Appendix B includes Table 10 and Table 11 with the questions that measured the dependent and
control variables.
TABLE 9
Levels for Anonymity and Expectation of Monetary Reward
Variable Low Condition High Condition
Anonymity Each posting includes the name,
department, and email address of the
person who posted it, so everyone
knows who posted the information.
The KMS is managed by an
independent company which ensures






No cash reward is given for the
postings.
To foster employees’ willingness to
post information into the KMS, each
posting is rewarded with a cash
bonus of $250.
Anonymity: To foster employees’
willingness to post information into
the KMS, the independent company
managing the KMS rewards each
posting with a cash bonus of $250.
TABLE 10
Dependent Variable: Intention to Share Information
Variables Measurement
Your coworker should post the information in the KMS. Likert 1–7
Your coworker will post the information in the KMS. Likert 1–7
If it were you rather than your coworker who had improved the process/made
the mistake, you should post the information.
Likert 1–7
If it were you rather than your coworker who had improved the process/made
the mistake, you would post the information.
Likert 1–7
Do you think your coworker will post the information into the KMS? Dichotomous yes/no
If it had been you rather than your coworker, would you post the information
into the KMS?
Dichotomous yes/no
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Individualism index (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005)
Have sufficient time for your personal or family life Likert 1–5
Have physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate
workspace, etc.)
Likert 1–5
Have secure employment Likert 1–5
Have an element of variety and adventure in the job Likert 1–5
Attitude toward knowledge sharing (Bock et al. 2005)
Sharing knowledge with other organizational members is good Likert 1–7
Sharing knowledge with other organizational members is harmful Likert 1–7
Sharing knowledge with other organizational members is valuable to me Likert 1–7
Sharing knowledge with other organizational members is a wise move Likert 1–7
Perceived effect on image (Kankanhalli et al. 2005)
Sharing my knowledge through a KMS would improve my image within the
organization
Likert 1–7
People in the organization who share their knowledge through a KMS would have
more prestige than those who do not
Likert 1–7
If I share my knowledge through a KMS, the people I work with will respect me Likert 1–7
If I share my knowledge through a KMS, my superiors would praise me Likert 1–7
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